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SEEING (JUST) IS BELIEVING:
FAITH AND IMAGINATION
M. J. Ferreira

Appeal to a 'leap' of faith has popularly been both used in defense of faith
by some and roundly criticized by others. Descriptions of such conversions
are often understood to refer to an exercise of 'will-power' -an intentional
(not merely voluntary) selection from a set of options which seem equally
'real' (or even one which goes against the more attractive option). In what
follows I challenge such a reading of the transition involved by examining a
variety of (mostly autobiographical) descriptions of coming to faith and, conversely, turning away from faith, in the light of accounts (by S. T. Coleridge
and William James) of leap and volition in non-religious contexts. I will argue
that the 'leaps' or transitions described in these religious accounts are more
appropriately understood in terms of imaginative activity than in terms of
either 'acts of will-power' or ineffable happenings.

Appeal to a 'leap' of faith has popularly been both used in defense of faith
by some and roundly criticized by others. The following autobiographical
account of a conversion seems to provide a paradigm example of just such a
'leap':
Today, crossing from one side of the room to the other, I lumped together all
I am, all I fear, hate, love, hope, and well, DID it. I committed all my ways
to God in Christ. 1

Before one can evaluate such an act, however, we need to know more precisely what the agent "DID." Such descriptions have often been understood
to refer to an exercise of 'will-power' -an intentional (and not merely voluntary) selection from a set of alternatives which seem equally 'real' (or even
one which goes against the more likely or attractive option). In what follows
I want to challenge such a reading of the transition involved. I will examine
a variety of (mostly autobiographical) descriptions of coming to faith and,
conversely, turning away from faith. I will approach these descriptions from
the vantage-point supplied by several intriguing accounts (by Samuel Taylor
Coleridge and William James) of leap and volition in non-religious contexts
to see what light is shed on the general category of conversion, and I will
argue that the 'leaps' or transitions described in these religious accounts are
more appropriately understood in terms of imaginative activity than in terms
of either 'acts of will-power' or ineffable happenings. My question, it should
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be clear, is not whether such a transition is a "decision" or not, but rather
with the character of the transition. My suggestion is that such a decision is
either (1) an achievement of imaginative activity, or at the very least (2)
involves imaginative activity in a way in which much of what we ordinarily
call decision need not, or (3) involves imaginative activity in a way which
we do not normally appreciate as part of all decision.

Let me begin with an account of a 'leap' in a non-religious context which
makes a striking association between leap and imagination. In Chapter VII
of his Biographia Literaria Samuel Taylor Coleridge invites us to "consider
what we do when we leap."2 His proposal begins as follows:
Let us consider what we do when we leap. We first resist the gravitating
power by an act purely voluntary, and then by another act, voluntary in part,
we yield to it in order to light on the spot, which we had previously proposed
to ourselves. Now let a man watch his mind... while he is trying to recollect
a name and he will find the process completely analogous.

Coleridge's indication that the character of a leap is illuminated by reference
to the process of trying to recollect a name suggests that it will be useful to
tum for a moment to his own description, elsewhere, of that frustrating
activity. We go through the alphabet "in vain," he writes, then the name "all
at once" starts up, "perfectly insulated, without any the dimmest antecedent
connection, as far as my consciousness extended;" the recollection occurs
suddenly, "by-act-of-will-unaided."3 The explanation, Coleridge continues,
depends on a "full sharp distinction of Mind from Consciousness-the Consciousness being the narrow Neck of the Bottle:"
The name, Daniel, must have been a living Atom-thought in my mind,
whose uneasy motions were the craving to recollect it-but the very craving led the mind to a reach where each successive disappointment (=a tiny
pain) tended to contract the orifice or outlet into Consciousness. Well-it
is given up-and all is quiet-the Nerves are asleep, or off their guardand then the Name pops up, makes its way, and there it is!-not assisted
by an association, but the very contrary-by the suspension and sedation
of all associations.

This activity, remember, he claims is "analogous" to what occurs in a "leap."
In the conclusion of his consideration of "what we do when we leap" he
elaborates the dual aspect of the leap and ties it to imagination. He describes
how an animal in parallel fashion to "what we do when we leap"
wins its way up aginst the stream, by alternate pulses of active and passive
motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to gather
strength and a momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion. 4

This description, he immediately continues, is "no unapt emblem of the
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mind's self-experience in the act of thinking," and his explanation of this is
striking:
There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other are
active and passive; and this is not possible without an intennediate faculty,
which is at once both active and passive. In philosophical language, we must
denominate this intennediate facuIty in all its degrees and detenninations,
the IMAGINATION.

We can glean from these passages the following interesting suggestions about
"what we do when we leap." First, the leap is said to be a "voluntary"
movement composed of "an act purely voluntary" and then "another act,
voluntary in part." The former is later referred to an "active" power, the latter
to a "passive" power-hence even the expression of the "passive" power (or
yielding) is, at least in part, a "voluntary" exercise. Second, the combination
of "two powers at work" is exercised through an intermediate faculty, the
IMAGINATION, "which is at once both active and passive." Third, the passive, yielding, act is paralleled with the process of recollecting a name, which
process is, he says, "by act-of-will-unaided." Fourth, that yielding only occurs in virtue of the "suspension and sedation of all associations." In sum,
then, Coleridge views the leap as (1) a "voluntary" yet "by-act-of-will-unaided" activity, (2) requiring the exercise of a faculty-Imagination-"which
is at once both active and passive," and (3) constituted as much by a yielding
as by an exercise of active power-a yielding illuminated by reference to the
"suspension and sedation of associations."
The element of yielding in the leap and the idea of the suspension and
sedation of associations are particularly intriguing in that they call to mind
aspects of William James's discussion of "volition." The parallel between the
two accounts can be instructive. In his Principles of Psychology James describes a case-an account of a decision to get out of bed on a cold morning-which seems to him "to contain in miniature form the data for an entire
psychology of volition."5 Consider someone saying "I must get up" but not
doing it-the "resolution faints away and postpones itself again and again
just as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into
the decisive act" (524). How, then, does one get up? His answer:
If I may generalize from my own experience, we more often than not get up
without any struggle or decision at all. We suddenly find that we have got
up. A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs; we forget both the wannth and
the cold; we fall into some revery connected with the day's life, in the course
of which the idea flashes across us, 'Hollo, I must lie here no longer' -an
idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing
suggestions, and consequently produces immediately its appropriate motor
effects. It was our acute consciousness of both the wannth and the cold during
the period of struggle which paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea of
rising in the condition of wish and not of will. (524-25)
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In all of this James is wanting to argue, he explains, against the "common
prejudice that voluntary action without 'exertion of will-power' is Hamlet
with the prince's part left out" (526). Here he echoes Coleridge's claim that
"voluntary" action may yet be "by-act-of-will-unaided."6
For James, it is not a question of 'will-power' -rather, we "find that we
have got up." It is not a "decision," he says, but rather "a fortunate lapse of
consciousness" which accounts for our getting out of bed; what is responsible
is not the idea 'I must lie here no longer', but rather (what Coleridge calls)
the suspension and sedation of those associations which could provide "contradictory or paralyzing suggestions." Admittedly, James's observations are
addressed to the question of the "mechanism of production" of "voluntary
[bodily] movements," which are the "only direct outward effects of our will;"
his topic is whether movement requires an "express fiat" preceding it. But
his discussion ultimately includes various types of decision-making in relation to such a 'fiat,' because "our higher thought is full" of the parallel
phenomenon of "blocking and its release" which is found in cases of bodily
movement (527). His example, therefore, has wider implications.
Examining "voluntary action," James writes that an "express fiat, or act of
mental consent to the movement, comes in when the neutralization of the
antagonistic and inhibitory idea is required," but is not needed "when the
conditions are simple" -in such cases voluntary action can occur "with no
fiat or express resolve." (526) We are less likely to think that "exertion of
will-power" is required in all cases if we realize that "consciousness is in its
very nature impulsive." Presumably, what is required in such cases is simply
a lapse or suspension, not a positive effort of will.
The "popular notion" that activity "must result from some superadded
'will-force'" is, he writes, "a very natural inference from those special cases
in which we think of an act for an indefinite length of time without the action
taking place." Such cases, however,
are not the nonn; they are cases of inhibition by antagonistic thoughts. When
the blocking is released we feel as if an inward spring were let loose, and
this is the additional impulse or fiat upon which the act effectively succeeds.
We shall study anon the blocking and its release. Our higher thought is full
of it. But where there is no blocking, there is naturally no hiatus between the
thought-process and the motor discharge." (526-7)

Even this "additional impulse or fiat" achieved by "release" is not to be
understood as "some superadded 'will-force'," however, for when we examine what James argues we do when "we are said to decide" we can see that
the appeal is not to will-power. The category of "deliberate action" or "action
after deliberation" is explained by him in terms of cases in which an extremely complex set of "motives and their conflict," ideas in antagonistic or
reinforcing relations, is present to our consciousness- "when finally the
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original suggestion either prevails and makes the movement take place, or
gets definitively quenched by its antagonists, we are said to decide, or to utter
our voluntary fiat in favor of one or the other course" (528). That prevailing
or quenching occurs against a background in which, while we realize "the
totality" of the ideas "more or less dimly all the while, certain parts stand
out more or less sharply at one moment in the foreground, and at another
moment other parts, in consequence of the oscillations of our attention, and
of the 'associative' flow of our ideas" (528-9). What we call 'decision' occurs,
that is, "in consequence of the oscillations of our attention." It is for this
reason that James's elaboration of his initial claim that "will consists in
nothing but a manner of attending to certain objects, or consenting to their
stable presence before the mind" (320) later yields the crucial suggestion that
"effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will" (562). In particular (and the emphases remain James's), "The essential achievement of the
will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to ATTEND to a difficuLt object
and hold it fast before the mind" (561).
James's reference to the phenomenon of attention fits in with Coleridge's
reference to imagination for a variety of reasons. To focus ourselves, to
"attend," is an activity of imagination because it requires a separating off, a
creative and hypothetical restructuring. Imagination is not only the paradigmatic synthesizing ability-it is also required for the "effort of attention" to
which James points. James's understanding of "attention" reminds us how
indispensable such focussing is, given the constant flux before us; the way
in which imagination allows us to "attend" is parallel, I suggest, to the way
imagination, for Coleridge, is the power "that fixing unfixes. "7
James discusses "four chief types" of decision or ways of ending deliberation in order to illustrate the lack of 'will-power' in most fiats. In what he
calls a "reasonable" type of decision the arguments before us leave "a clear
balance in favour of one alternative, which alternative we then adopt without
effort or constraint" (531). In such a case we have "a perfect sense of being
free, in that we are devoid of any feeling of coercion" even though "the
'reasons which decide us" appear to "owe nothing to our will." In cases where
no "paramount or authoritative reason for either course" is apparent, however,
"our feeling is to a certain extent that of letting ourselves drift" in a direction
"accidentally determined" either from without or from within; these determinations constitute the second and third type of decision.
The fourth form of decision is described in ways which seem especially
relevant to our concern with conversion, for they are "changes of heart,
awakenings of conscience, etc., which make new men of so many of us"
(533). They come, James says,
when, in consequence of some outer experience or some inexplicable inward
change, we suddenly pass from the easy and careless to the sober and stren-
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uous mood, or possibly the other way. The whole scale of values of our
motives and impulses then undergoes a change like that which a change of
the observer's level produces on a view.... The character abruptly rises to
another 'level; and deliberation comes to an immediate end. (533)

In some cases, then, decision is constituted by something like a "change of
the observer's level" or an abrupt rise "to another 'leveL ..' These phrases call
to mind the phenomenon of a gestalt shift in perspective and James's claim
is that such a shift in effect immediately ends deliberation.
What distinctively characterizes a fifth type of decision and separates it
subjectively or phenomenally from the others is the "slow dead heave of the
will that is felt," the feeling of effort," "the sense of inward effort" (534). In
this case, whether "reason has balanced the books" or not, James writes,
we feel, in deciding, as if we ourselves by our own wilful act inclined the
beam; in the former case by adding our living effort to the weight of the
logical reason which, taken alone, seems powerless to make the act discharge;
in the latter by a kind of creative contribution of something instead of a reason
which does a reason's work. (534)

What misleads us into thinking such effort usually accompanies decision is
"the fact that during deliberation we so often have a feeling of how great an
effort it would take to make a decision now. Later, after the decision has made
itself with ease, we recollect this and erroneously suppose the effort also to
have been made then" (535). But in contrast to this "peculiar sort of mental
phenomenon," he concludes, "the immense majority of human decisions are
decisions without effort."
Now, although James does not, like Coleridge, explicitly refer to imagination in the processes he describes, the role of "lapse" and "release" in his
account of decision (attempting as it does to disabuse us of the notion that a
"superadded 'will-force'" is necessary to cause movement or end deliberation) leaves room for the activity of imagination, for it has been argued that
the suspension of traditional associations is precisely the task of imagination. 8
In this respect we can see James's account as implying a role for imagination. 9
But James also, as we have seen above, provides some specification of this
locus of imaginative activity when, qualifying a crude notion of the effort of
will involved in decisions, he highlights the importance (a) of a shift in
perspective, (b) of 'finding' ourselves in the situation of having already made
the decisive transition, and (c) of the phenomenon of "attention."
Independently of the question of the adequacy of these accounts by Coleridge and James of leap and volition, both accounts are suggestive and provide what I think can be a fruitful vantage-point for assessing accounts of
religious conversion. At the very least, their emphasis on notions of yielding,
suspension, sedation, and of action which is active and passive at the same
time, counteracts a one-sidedly active account of leaping or volition. Sec-
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ondly, they suggest an important role for imagination in their enriched notion
of the activity of leaping or volition; Coleridge does this directly, and James
does this indirectly. I want now to consider several accounts of conversion
from this vantage-point.

2
Consider again the account of conversion noted at the outset:
Today, crossing from one side of the room to the other, I lumped together all
I am, all I fear, hate, love, hope, and well, DID it. I committed all my ways
to God in Christ.

It is easy to see why the idiom of will sounds appropriate-namely, to emphasize the active, free, and qualitative change or transition. In light of the
preceding, however, we can now ask how this account relates to those given
by Coleridge and James: in what way might this be seen as an activity
exercised through imagination; does this activity exhibit a 'yielding' dimension; is it voluntary yet without exertion of 'will-power'; does anything in
the account correspond to "attention" and to the "suspension and sedation"
of associations?

2.A
The following interpretation of this account of conversion along those lines
suggests itself: namely, that the lumping together of hopes and fears and loves
and hates is an imaginative activity-an imaginative gathering, a synthesis
and extension by imagination-which effects a re-orienting shift of perspective. What the agent did, that is, could be understood as an imaginative
gathering together of her self, in which a decisive re-orientation is accomplished. What she did, then, was to experience a change in her "observer's
level," to see something new come into focus. 10 The act of committing herself
could be understood, not as a decision which followed upon the lumping
together of her hopes and fears and loves, but rather as an active recognition
or affirmation of the attraction and alignment which she saw in her newlygathered self.
In Coleridge's terms, what she did was an imaginative gathering (propulsion), an active and free lumping things together in a new way which came
after disciplined, desiring, inquiry-lumping them together in such a way as
to see it differently (yielding) and be changed by it. In both Coleridge's and
James's terms, what she did just was a letting-go of hitherto-accepted associations-it was a shift in perspective, an abrupt rise to another level of
observation, a transition which is not achievable by fiat, but rather by imaginative synthesis and extension. The synthesis and extension which issues in
a re-visioning of life is an activity of imagination which can be read, not as
prolegomenon to a change, but as constituting the change which alters her
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whole life. In other words, the description of her 'leap' could be explained
as the achievement of a new imaginative engagement: a recognition of what
is implied in the perception of the self as gathered together in this way, a
re-orienting shift in perspective.
On such a reading coming to faith is the surrender of an old vision in the
activity of seeing a new way in which things can be together. It assumes an
imaginative positing of counter-factuals and hypotheticals-for example, it
involves assuming a hypothetical place (or many such places simultaneously)
from which to assess what stands before us. Such a seeing things together in
a new way is an imaginative suspension because it is a paradoxical seeing of
what is both not yet and already there, for sometimes it is only by conceiving
(putting together imaginatively) what could be there that we recognize what
is already there. Such a shift in perspective arising from imaginative activity-a seeing things together differently-would be a free, qualitative, transition or leap as much as any intentional, 'on purpose,' self-conscious,
decision would.

2. B
The plausibility of this kind of interpretation of a description of a 'leap of
faith' is supported by other autobiographical accounts of conversion. Writing
movingly of his decision to leave the Anglican Church for that of Rome, one
author tells how, having been "on the brink" for a year and a half, he responds
to a friend's question by a realization:
Then it came to me that perhaps I could go on drifting, but, if I faced up to
decision, I could not reject Holy Mother Church-just as, long years before,
I had realised that I could not reject Jesus .... if I cannot reject the Church-if
only one way is possible-I have decided, haven't I?".ll

The implication here is that the moment of choice is really one of coming to
see that we have already decided-that is, we realize that we have already
become engaged with a possibility in a re-orienting, hence 'decisive,' way.
As James says, "we find that we have got up." What one calls the 'decision'
is the realization of our decisive engagement with a possibility, the realization
of how real it is for us. That we can stifle or undermine its impact on us, its
power to engage us, does not show that we can or must deliberately decide
to feel that power.
A similar appeal to the non-volitionalist dimension of such change is found
in the various accounts of conversion experiences recorded by a very wellknown convert, C. S. Lewis. In his autobiography, Surprised by Joy, Lewis
describes a succession of 'conversions' of differing kinds. His description of
one early transition is clearly in terms of a shift in perspective, a new seeing
of old-yet-new: he writes that what was now seen was in some sense exactly
like the old, yet "all was changed. "12 Moreover, his was a sense that some-
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thing was "out of reach not because of something I could not do but because
of something I could not stop doing"-more precisely, "If 1 could only leave
off, let go, unmake myself, it would be there. "13 Such an affirmation of the
role of letting go or yielding informs his conclusion that "all this was given
to me without asking, even without consent."14
Although Lewis's account of his later and distinctively religious conversion
is framed in the idiom of 'choice,' his actual explication of the character of
the choice reinforces the sense of it as a realization or new seeing or a shift
in perspective. For example, when he writes that "I felt myself being, there
and then, given a free choice," he qualifies this significantly-"I say, '1
chose,' yet it did not really seem possible to do the opposite. "15 He continues
to explain: "People talk about 'man's search for God.' To me, as 1 then was,
they might as well have talked about the mouse's search for the cat." 16 Even
more dramatically, he suggests that "it was more like when a man, after long
sleep, still lying motionless in bed, becomes aware that he is now awake."17
Lewis's own retrospective look, in a later interview, at his earlier descriptions also repeatedly qualifies the ordinary sense of ·decision.· To the
interviewer's question, "Do you feel that you made a decision at the time of
your conversion?" Lewis responds
I would not put it that way. What I wrote in Surprised by Joy was that 'before
God closed in on me, I was in fact offered what now appears a moment of
wholly free choice.' But I feel my decision was not so important. I was the
object rather than the subject in this affair. I was decided upon. "18

The interviewer's rejoinder-"That sounds to me as if you came to a very
definite point of decision" -is met by Lewis's explanation:
Well, I would say that the most deeply compelled action is also the freest
action. By that I mean, no part of you is outside the action. It is a paradox.
I expressed it in Surprised by Joy by saying that I chose, yet it really did not
seem possible to do the opposite."19

Lewis obviously wants to preclude an understanding of the conversion as a
purely passive happening, and his reference to the exercise of an activity
which is at the same time compelled yet free, hence passive yet active, recalls
Coleridge's view of imagination. What occurs in the 'choice' is imaginative
because it is an admittedly paradoxical holding together of opposites. The
'choice' is, in sum, an abrupt shift of the observer's level in and through a
yielding which is voluntary, free, and yet without a "superadded ·will-force· ...

2. C
Even this sketchy review of several accounts of conversion experiences
shows that the metaphor of a 'leap' of faith (insofar as it suggests a deliberate
volition or superadded effort of will) does not do justice to self-descriptions
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of what occurs. These conversion accounts record choices, but dimensions of
yielding, letting go, and realization, are revealed as integral to such choices.
This is so, I suggest, because choice cannot be understood apart from interests, and what we are interested in is what we have become imaginatively
attracted by or engaged with. But even more strongly, we could say that
choice may just be the decisive engagement, the reorienting realization or
shift in perspective, and thus needs to be understood in terms of the activity
of imagination.
This is, I think, Iris Murdoch's point as well when, attempting in ethics to
replace a model of will by a model of vision, she emphasizes the "slow and
delicate process of imagination and will" which informs our world with value,
so that "when moments of decision arrive we see and are attracted by the
world we have already (partly) made. "20 When the moment of choice arrives,
what is called for is not an extrinsic decision, but a realization of what we
have been attracted to, that is, what we have been deciding. It is an affirmation
of what, as Coleridge says, "finds" usY Like Coleridge she sees imagination
as an activity which is neither simply active nor simply passive-it is a seeing
and a doing. She writes that imagination is
a type of reflection on people, events, etc., which builds detail, adds colour,
conjures up possibilities in ways which go beyond what could be said to be
strictly factual. 22

It is, she continues, at the same time a "doing" -a "sort of personal explor-

ing" which is, she says, hard to distinguish from willing.
Murdoch's understanding of the role of imagination in informing our world
with values prior to the moment of decision and her rejection of the possibility
of 'pure' (uncontextualized) will in 'decision' are an echo of Soren
Kierkegaard's own characterization and qualification of 'choice.' His
psuedonymous author and representative of the ethical, Judge William, claims
that "the personality is already interested in the choice before one
chooses"23-the possibilities which reveal themselves to us are in part constituted by our prior investment of the world with particular values. There is,
he says, no such thing as a neutral "instant of deliberation"24 in which one
stands in no relationship to the things between which one is to choose:
to think that for an instant one can keep one's personality a blank, or that
strictly speaking one can break off and bring to a halt the course of the
personal life, is a delusion. 25

Judge William's claim that "through the choice the personality immerses
itself in the thing chosen"26 can be read in two ways-either the immersion is
seen as the result of a prior and separable choice, or the immersion is seen as
what constitutes the choice. Choice, on this latter view, just is allowing one
engagement or attraction to win out, to take precedence, i.e., to be decisive.
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This implication of being-already-attracted or being-already- interested is
what 1 take Margaret A. Farley to refer to when she writes that in free choice
we already see the reasons and are already leaning into the desires before we
choose .... Choice is, therefore, my ratification of one desire (rather than its
alternative), my allowing this desire (rather than its opposing alternatives) to
issue in actionY

She explains: in free choice there is an "internal 'action' of our mind and
heart" in which "I, so to speak, 'identify' with one desire and the action which
is its object, and I 'let go of' the others ......28 Kierkegaard's Johannes CIimacus likewise speaks of "real action" in terms of an "internal decision in which
the individual puts an end to the mere possibility and identifies himself with
the content of his thought in order to exist in it. "29 The notion of 'identification with' a desire or thought-content calls to mind the idea of imaginative
activity more than it calls to mind the idea of deliberate volition: we talk of
identifying with a person when we are so attracted by something about them
that we feel 'one' with them or when we sympathetically put ourselves in
their place. Such 'identification with' someone is an imaginative extension,
or an imaginative transcending of 'otherness,' which is not capable of being
effected by fiat. We find ourselves identifying with a person or a cause; we
cannot simply choose to •identify with' them in any but a most external sense.
That is, we can deliberately identify ourselves as attracted to or sympathetic
with them (we can announce our allegiance or put our name on a membership
roster), but we do that only because we have already identified with (become
attracted or interested by, engaged with) their goals, desires, values, etc.
Seeing choice or decision in terms of 'identification with' would both
emphasize the role of imagination in human activity and preclude a radical
separation or contrast between will and imagination. 30 This difficulty in radically contrasting will and imagination would explain why Murdoch could
write that once we admit the active character of imagination as 'exploring',
it is "difficult not to see this as an exercise of will. "31 It would explain why
Farley could write that the "radical decision" involved in choosing to remain
faithful to a love
is not just an appeal within me to my 'will power.' It is the recognition that
there are certain ways I cannot allow myself to think. The key is more in my
imagination than in my will.32

This difficulty in contrasting will and imagination would also account for
what Josef Pieper describes as an "enlarged concept of will. "33 Here an act
of will is not seen as a decision to act; a volition does not mean merely a will
to act. Willing is not seen simply as the faculty of bringing about what does
not yet exist-a causal faculty of bringing objects into existence-but rather
willing is seen in terms of wanting, affirming, loving something that already

162

Faith and Philosophy

exists. In this sense "will" returns to its more classical (Aristotelian or Thomistic) sense-i.e, the faculty of desire or rational appetite. Such affirmation
or loving is parallel to the engagement, attraction, interestedness which we
have already considered as an imaginative activity.

2.D
The conviction, expressed in the second account of conversion noted earlier, that "only one way is possible" is surely not meant to deny the undeniable-namely, that other ways are in some sense also possible, for they are
actually exemplified in the lives of others we know; it is not an expression
of a compulsion which renders us unfree, but rather an expression of the way
in which one possibility has decisively become 'real' for us. We cannot effect
that engagement by a decision by fiat. Flannery O'Connor makes the same
point indirectly when she writes to a correspondent: "I hope you'll find the
experience you need to make the leap toward Christianity seem the only one
to YOU." 34 But a leap which seems to be "the only one" is surely an imaginative crystallization, a decisive engagement, rather than a selection among
equally real alternatives; its seeming to be "the only one" is thus not a denial
of the possibility of other ways or of our freedom, but rather an indication
of the constraint compatible with a free recognition. This, I take it, is what
C. S. Lewis meant when he wrote: "I say, 'I chose,' yet it did not really seem
possible to do the opposite," and commenting on that, explained that "the
most deeply compelled action is also the freest action. "35 It is also what I
take Judge William to mean when he writes that if, driven by the recognition
of the contradiction in the esthetic, we "contemplate existence under ethical
categories," we "will see that only then does existence become beautiful, that
only in this way can a man succeed in saving his soul and gaining the whole
world ...... 36
The model of gestalt shift is relevant here. In a situation where a gestalt
shift can occur, initially we can see only one possibility (for example, a
duck-figure); at some point, after concentrated attention or perhaps after
coaching or guidance, another alternative (a rabbit-figure) comes into focus
for us. Initially only one option seems 'real' to us; although we can be told
of and admit the possibility of another option, at the critical moment of
transition there is no set of equally real alternatives which we recognize from
among which to choose-the moment of transition is rather the point at which
what has been an abstract possibility (one we have been assured is there)
suddenly comes into focus for us, the point at which it is so real that it seems
to be the only way to see it (though, of course, we can try to revive the earlier
picture by an effort of re-focussing). The examples I have considered suggest
that this "critical threshhold" or point of recognition is what in the description
of faith is often called the 'decision.'
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Seeing the rabbit-figure for the first time is not the direct or immediate
result of a decision or volition, although it may take much preliminary effort
(and hence be an indirect result). It is not a choice in any standard sense
because initially we see only the one possibility; at the outset we recognize
no other equally real alternatives. We can decide or choose to look for the
rabbit-figure which we are told is there and cannot yet see, but we cannot
decide or choose to see (recognize) it. We can directly do what will in all
probability lead us to see the figure, but we cannot directly make ourselves
see it. Recognizing it, then, is a qualitative (and free) transition which is not
achievable by fiat; it is not the direct result of willing, nor is it the necessary
result of the effort to look for it.
Such a shift in perspective is, I suggest, what Iris Murdoch describes as a
"piecemeal" effort working up to moments where "most of the business of
choosing is already over," rather than a leap of will at a crucial moment.J7
Stanley Hauerwas, following Murdoch, suggests that the 'decision' called for
is neither a "sudden leap the isolated will makes" nor an efficacious assertion
of Will. 38 He explains his alternative in terms of a "disciplined overcoming
of the self that allows for the clarification of our vision" -he emphasizes not
an act of will, but "attention" and "reorientation" of vision. 39 Hauerwas reveals his indebtedness to Simone Weil's thought on "attention," but William
James too, as we noted earlier, saw "effort of attention" as the "essential
phenomenon of will;" in particular, "the esential achievement of the will, in
short, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold
it fast before the mind. "40 Rollo May reminds us of James's explicit identification of 'belief,' 'attention,' and 'will,' and concludes that James's contribution is to show that "The effort which goes into the exercise of the will is
really effort of attention; the strain in willing is the effort to keep the consciousness clear, i.e., the strain of keeping the attention focussed. "41
Murdoch's suggestion of a "piecemeal" effort is not contrary to the qualitative gestalt shift I have been using as an analogy-this shift in perspective
occurs only when a 'critical threshhold' has been reached, but it cannot occur
unless preliminary material is registered or processed. In this sense the shift
is able to be spoken of as both continuous and discontinuous. The decision
which seems necessary turns out to be the recognition or realization that we
have already decided. It is, on the one hand, the result of a "piecemeal" effort
without being the cumulative issue of a quantitative process, and on the other
hand, the qualitatively different character of the realization is achieved without being the direct result of a momentary act of will.
In sum, while disciplined inquiry may be deliberately undertaken, and
while a deliberate decision may be necessary to put oneself in a place conducive to the shift in perspective, the shift itself is an activity of imagination
more than of deliberate decision. Some deliberate decisions may be a neces-
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sary preliminary to the new seeing, or seem appropriate as a response to the
new seeing, but it is the new seeing itself which is effectively the leap or
qualitative transition. It is not a case of seeing before you leap, or leaping
before you see-the new seeing is the leap in understanding. On such a
reading the new seeing would constitute the letting-go of an old seeing. Such
a qualitative shift in perspective is an example then of a qualitative transition
which is distinguishable from a quantitative process as well as from a momentary, separable, act of will which fills a gap. In particular, the category
of a 'critical threshhold' seems especially suited to illuminate this kind of
transition (which is not reached by degrees, yet cannot occur unless preliminary material is registered and processed) and to show why one wants to say
of it both that it is continuous and discontinuous. 39
An understanding of willing in these terms is consonant with and reinforced
by the non-deliberate character of the leap found in accounts of a converse
'leap of unfaith.' One of the most famous is Tolstoy's description of a man's
loss of faith. It was not, he insists,
because he had resolved something in his heart, but simply because this
comment of his brother's ['Do you still do that?' in response to his kneeling
to pray] was like a finger being pushed against a wall that was on the verge
of collapsing from its own weight. These words indicated that the place where
he had thought faith to be had long been empty and that the words he spoke,
the signs of the cross and genuflections he made in prayer, were essentially
meaningless actions. Having recognized their meaninglessness he could no
longer continue doing them.43

Similarly, in a contemporary autobiography the author not only tells us how,
after reading some Catholic literature, he first "saw the world in a new way,
saw explanations where there had been frustrating mysteries and alluring
mysteries where there had been unsatisfying explanations,"44 but also details
the non-volitional process of the decay or cancelling of that faith. Working
with metaphors of faith's slipping away and dissolving, he writes of the
process in which his earlier stance "started to seem irrelevant:"
Particular beliefs became obscure, grew faint and at last vanished; urgencies
melted and crumbled; attachments loosened and became undone. The world
I had been inhabiting shifted and rearranged itself along a new axis. 45

We cannot deliberately choose to make something seem irrelevant, or to
make an urgency melt. Such accounts suggest, then, that in either direction, coming to or turning from faith, the qualitative transition is a new,
active, and free, seeing rather than the achievement of a deliberate, selfconscious decision.
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